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Abstract
Christiaensen,  Demery, and Paternostro  review  recent  e  Economic policy reforms  (improving
evidence  on the trends in household  well-being  in Africa  macroeconomic  balances  and  liberalizing markets) have
during thc  1990s. They  draw on the findings  of a series  been conducive  to reducing poverty.
of studies on poverty dynamics that use the better data  * Market connectedness  is key for the poor to benefit
sets now available.  The authors  begin  by taking a broad  from new opportunities generated by  economic growth.
view of poverty,  tracing changes  in both income poverty  Some population  groups and regions, by virtue of their
and in other more direct measures of individual welfare.  sheer remoteness,  have been  left behind when  growth
Experiences  have been varied:  several  countries have  picks up.
seen a sharp decline  in poverty, while some  hlave  * Education  and access to land further condition  the
witnessed a marked increase. Yet,  in the aggregate,  extent to which households  can benefit from economic
economic growth has been pro-poor. Nonetheless,  the  opportunities and escape  poverty.
aggregate  numbers  also hide significant and systematic  Finally,  rainfall variations and  ill health are found to
distributional  effects which have caused some groups to  have profound effects on poverty outcomes in Africa
be  left behind.  underscoring the significance  of social protection  in a
The authors draw four key conclusions:  poverty  reduction  strategy.
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Does the Dollar and Kraay  (2000:  27) view, that 'anyone who cares about the poor should favor
the growth-enhancing  policies of good rule of law, fiscal discipline, and openness to international
trade'  apply to Africa  in the  1990s?  Or is the growth path the reforms induced characterized  by
increasing  inequality,  denying benefits  to  the poorest (Stewart,  1995;  Mkandawire  and Soludo,
1999;  Forsyth,  2000).  There  is  no  simple  answer  to  this  question,  given  the  real-world
complexity of recent African history.  The 1990s in Africa witnessed many changes that affected
people's  lives  and  livelihoods.  In  addition  to  economic  and  political  reforms,  external
opportunities  and constraints  shifted  during the decade, with many countries  experiencing  sharp
movements  in  their  terms  of trade.  Some  countries  faced  internal  civil  strife  and  political
instability.  Others  had to endure one of the worst droughts  of the century.  And there have been
serious  health shocks,  such as  AIDS  and  malaria, affecting  rich and poor alike.  The effects  of
these  changes  on  growth  and  poverty  were  further  conditioned  by  the  private  and  public
endowments  households  possessed-their  physical  assets,  human  capital,  and  their  access  to
infrastructure  and public services.
This complexity makes for considerable  debate about the relationship between policy, growth and
poverty  in  Africa-a  debate  that  was  previously  not  always  well  served  with  hard  evidence
(Stewart,  1995).  This  paper sheds light on this debate by utilizing the much-improved  data base
in Africa, and by addressing three central questions:
*  First, what does recent evidence tell  us about the evolution of overall poverty and inequality
in Africa and its relation with economic  growth (and recession)?
*  Second,  moving  beyond  the  national  averages,  did  particular  population  groups  or
geographical  regions gain or lose from the episodes of reform-induced growth?
*  Third,  among  the wide  array  of disparate  events and  factors  affecting  growth  and  poverty
trends, which emerge as key in explaining changes in income  distribution and poverty?
The paper builds  on the results  of a  recent  series of Poverty Dynamics country  studies'  which
exploit  recent  (1990s)  household  survey  data  in  Africa.  It  examines  the  main  factors  behind
observed  poverty  trends  by  first  taking  a  macro-perspective, linking  the  historical  changes  in
' Countries were selected based on the availability of comparable measures of consumption and include
Ethiopia,  Ghana, Madagascar,  Mauritania,  Nigeria, Uganda,  Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  The paper also draws2
income  poverty  in  our  sample  countries  to  changes  in  economic  environment-the  macro-
economic  and  sectoral  policy  frameworks,  and  the  institutional  setting.  We  then exploit the
survey data to greater  depth by taking a micro-perspective.  This assesses how households  (and
poor  households  in  particular)  have  been  affected  by the  events  of the  1990s,  distinguishing
between  the effects  of policies and  of shocks.  When available, household panel  data have  been
used  (Ethiopia and Uganda),  though  important insights  were  also  obtained  from repeated  cross
sections (Zimbabwe,  Ghana, Madagascar).  The paper highlights the main insights emerging  from
this selected sample of micro-econometric  country studies on Africa.
Considering that well-being is multifaceted,  the paper begins with a review  (in section ID of the
changes  that  have  occurred in  income,  education,  health  and nutrition.  We  first examine  how
these  four  different  dimensions  of well-being  have  evolved  during  the  1990s  at the  aggregate
level.  We then move beyond the aggregates  and look at their evolution across  income  quintiles,
focusing  particularly  on  how  welfare  of the poorest  groups  fared.  The  section  concludes  by
describing the evolution of overall  income poverty and inequality, and its relation with economic
growth.  In  the  two  sections that  follow  we  seek to explain  the  systematic  changes  in  income
distribution  and  poverty  in  Africa,  taking  both  macro  (Section  III)  and  micro  (Section  IV)
perspectives.  Concluding observations  are made  in the final section.
II.  Living standards during the 1990s
To set the scene, Table  1  reports four basic measures of well-being: private  consumption, primary
school enrollment,  child malnutrition,  and child mortality.  The first and obvious point to note is
that living  standards  are very  low  in these  countries.  By the  close of the  decade,  no  country
enjoyed an annual per capita consumption in excess of $500, and in Ethiopia it was just $87.  All
countries  fall  far  short  of universal  primary  enrollment,  and  in  some  (for example,  Ethiopia)
primary  enrollments  are  unacceptably  low.  Malnutrition  is  also  a  very  serious  problem,
especially  in Ethiopia and Madagascar.  In Ethiopia,  about two thirds of children  exhibit signs of
stunting or long-term malnutrition (defined  as the percentage of children with low height for age
compared  with  a reference  population).  Even  in  Ghana,  Mauritania  and  Zimbabwe,  there  is
evidence of stunting  in about a quarter of the population under 5 years of age.  Perhaps the most
poignant  indicator  of the  very  low  welfare  levels  of these  countries  is  the  incidence  of child
on an analysis of time series data from the Demographic and Health Surveys.  References to these Poverty3
deaths.  Under-age-five  mortality exceeds  100 (per 1000) in all countries.  In Zambia,  almost one
in five children fail to survive to their fifth birthday.  Too many children are dying needlessly.
Table 1: Evolving living standards selected  African countries in the 1990s
Real  private  Net Primary  School  Child Malnutrition (3)  Child Mortality  (4)
consumption per capita  Enrolment  Rates(
2)
(constant 1995 US $)()
Year  Year  Annual  Year  Year  Change  Year  Year  Change  Year  Year  Change
one  two  growth  one  two  (/o  one  two  (%  one  two  (per
rate  (%l)  (%lo)  points)  (%)  (%6)  points)  (per  (per  1000)




1994-1997  80  87  3.3  19  25  +6  66  55  -1].  190  175  -15
Ghana
1992-98  293  324  1.6  70  82  +12  26  26  0  119  104  -15
Mauritania
1987-95  296  353  3.3  28  41  +13  48  23  -25  - 149  -
Uganda




1993-1999  223  219  -0.2  48  64  +16  50  49  -1  170  149  -21
Zambia
1993-98  345  266  -5.4  73  66  -7  40  43  +3  194  189  -5
Nigeria
1992-96  206  210  0.4  94  98  +4  38  - - 136  147  11
Zimbabwe
1991-96  626  461  -6.2  83  86  +3  30  23  -7  77  108  31
Growth rates calculated  based on least squared method, which is less  sensitive to choice of base and terminal period.
(2) Net enrolment rates = percentage of children of school age enrolled  in primary  school as a fraction of the total number of children  in
that age group. Figures  obtained  from the surveys  analyzed  in  the Poverty  Dynamics studies.  First year figure for Ethiopia refers to
1996.  Figures for Nigeria reflect gross enrollment rates in 1994 and  1996 and  are obtained from World Development  Indicators.
(3) Child malnutrition  defined  as  the percentage  of children  stunted,  i.e.  z-score of height for  age which is less than -2; the reference
periods for these figures approximate  to those in column 1;
(4) Child mortality under 5 (per 1000 live births); the reference periods approximate  to those in columnn  1.
Source: World Bank data and country studies  under Dynamics of Poverty study.
Second,  there  are  differences  in  the changes in  these  indicators  over time.  In  four  countries
economic  living  standards  appear  to  have  improved.  But  in  Madagascar,  average  real
consumption remained more  or less  unchanged,  while  it fell  sharply  in Zambia  and  Zimbabwe.
Similarly,  improvements  in  primary  school  enrollment  in  Ethiopia,  Ghana,  Mauritania  and
Uganda contrast with unsatisfactory  outcomes  in Zambia.  Ethiopia and Mauritania  experienced
sharp  reductions  in  long-term  malnutrition,  but  there  was  little  progress  elsewhere.  In  all
countries  except  Zimbabwe,  the  long  term  downward  trend  in  child  mortality  appears  to  have
continued  through  the  decade.  But  child  deaths  have  risen  sharply  in  Zimbabwe,  a  result
probably related to the AIDS epidemic  (among other factors).
Dynamics studies  are given in the bibliography.4
Third, the trends in the indicators are generally  consistent with each other, though there are some
important  exceptions.  In  the  four  countries  experiencing  economic  growth  (Ethiopia,  Ghana,
Mauritania and Uganda)  the trends in human development indicators  match the improvement in
economic  well-being.  But in those experiencing  stagnation  and  decline, the signals  are noisier.
In  some cases  the education indicator  improved despite the decline  in economic living standards
(Madagascar,  Nigeria  and  Zimbabwe).  Child  mortality  improved  in  Zambia  and  child
malnutrition  improved  in  Zimbabwe  during  episodes  of deteriorating  economic  circumstance.
Such outcomes  serve as  a  reminder that  focusing  only on one  dimension  of well-being  can be
misleading when tracking poverty dynamics over time (World Bank, 2000).
Inequality in human development
The  indicators  in  Table  1 are  averages  for  the  population  as  a  whole.  We  now review  the
distribution of these  indicators  across  the  populations,  identifying  especially  changes  in  the
welfare of poorer households.  We begin with the human development indicators.  Primary school
enrollments  are particularly low in Ethiopia (Table 2), and to a lesser extent in Mauritania.  The
poorest  households  in  these countries  typically  do not enroll  their children in primary  schools.
But  there have  been major  strides  in raising  primary  enrollments  during the  decade  in  Ghana,
Madagascar,  Mauritania,  and Uganda.  And where  there have been education  enrollment  gains,
they have included the poor.  Only Zambia seems to have lost ground.
Table 2.  Primary net enrollment rates by consumption quintile for seven  African countries
Ethiopia  Ghana  Madagascar  Mauritania  Uganda  Zambia  Zimbabwe
Survey Year  1996  1997  1992  1998  1993  1999  1987  1995  1992  1997  1993  1998  1991  1996
Poorest quintile  15.0  17.0  54.4  70.1  29.3  53.2  19.4  25.0  54.4  79.6  57.5  49.8  77.9  80.8
Second quintile  15.0  24.0  69.1  81.2  43.4  64.8  25.4  40.8  63.2  87.0  67.1  61.6  82.2  84.6
Third quintile  18.0  27.0  73.0  86.3  59.0  64.0  29.4  48.6  68.9  88.0  75.2  68.6  83.6  87.2
Fourth quintile  21.0  28.0  76.8  87.1  59.7  68.0  31.6  49.6  74.7  86.6  81.9  74.8  85.7  89.2
Richest quintile  30.0  33.0  87.2  90.2  59.6  77.7  40.9  60.0  85.7  89.4  86.0  80.7  89.0  90.9
Ql/Q5  0.50  0.52  0.62  0.78  0.49  0.68  0.47  0.42  0.63  0.89  0.67  0.62  0.88  0.89
Source:  Country studies under Dynamics of Poverty study (see bibliography).
Because  income  data  were  not  collected  in  the  Demographic  and  Health  Surveys,  Sahn  et  al.
(1999)  constructed  a proxy  index  for income  based  on assets  and  household  amenities.  This
enabled  them  to examine  trends  in  child  health capabilities  (survival  and  nutrition)  by wealth
class.  The  poorest  20  percent  of  the  populations  appear  to  be  the  worst  affected  by  the
deterioration  in pre-school  child nutrition  (Table 3).  Stunting  (measured by height-for-age)  has5
deteriorated  among  the  poorest  in  four  countries  (Ghana,  Mali,  Senegal  and  Tanzania)  and
improved  in four (Madagascar,  Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe).  But short-run malnutrition, or
wasting  (measured  by  weight  for height),  has  increased  among  the  poorest  quintiles  of  six
countries  (Ghana,  Madagascar,  Mali,  Senegal,  Uganda  and Zimbabwe).  In  general,  the  data
indicate a major problem of increased wasting during the  1990s including among the poor.  This
is not fully understood,  and clearly calls for further investigation.
Table 3. Malnutrition by wealth quintile for eight African countries
Percent of children  between 3 and 36 months of  age with anthropometric  z-score less than -2
Ghana  Madagascar  Mali  Senegal  Tanzania  Uganda  Zambia  Zimbabwe
Survey Year  1988  1993  1992  1997  1987  1995  1986  1992  1991  1996  1988  1995  1992  1997  1988  1994
Heightfor  age:
Poorest quinule  34  38  53  50  28  38  27  35  43  46  48  43  49  46  41  23
Second quintile  33  30  45  40  29  39  23  30  44  44  45  40  45  49  37  24
Third quintile  30  29  51  51  25  34  24  30  43  42  44  40  39  43  27  25
Fourth quintile  27  23  50  49  26  32  25  20  40  39  42  33  30  33  25  22
Richestquintile  21  17  44  46  17  21  13  14  26  28  27  25  27  27  12  12
QI/Q5  1.6  2.2  1.2  1.1  1.6  1.8  2.1  2.5  1.7  1.6  1.8  1.7  1.8  1.7  3.4  1.9
Weightfor height:
Poorestquinble  7  16  6  10  12  28  7  15  9  8  2  6  7  5  1  5
Second quintile  9  10  8  7  11  22  4  14  7  10  4  7  7  7  2  4
Third quinb le  8  15  7  7  13  24  7  12  5  9  4  7  5  6  1  5
Fourtb quintile  8  10  4  5  10  23  8  12  6  9  0  4  6  5  1  6
Richest quintile  7  9  4  5  9  23  4  8  7  6  0  4  6  4  1  5
QI/Q5  1.0  1.8  1.5  2.0  1.3  1.2  1.8  1.9  1.3  1.3  - 1.5  1.2  1.3  1.0  1.0
Source:  Sahn et al (1999).
Most  countries  have  experienced  declines  in  mortality  among  the  poor,  the  exceptions  being
Kenya,  Zambia  and  Zimbabwe  (Table  4).  The  trends  are  not  always  uniform  across  wealth
groups,  with a widening of the mortality gap between rich and poor.  The ratio of mortality levels
among the poorest to the richest quintiles has increased  in most cases-where mortality has been
falling,  it has fallen faster among the richest group.  The exceptions are Zambia and Zimbabwe.6
Table 4:  Infant and under-age three mortality by asset index for nine African countries
For  five-year cohorts of  children born one and three  years prior  to the survey, respectively.  Per 1000 births.
Ghana  Kenya  Madagascar  Mali  Senegal
Survey Year  1988  1993  1988  1993  1992  1997  1987  1995  1986  1992  1997
Cohort at risk  '83-'87  '88-'92  '83-'87  '88-92  '87-91  '92-'96  '82-86  '90-'94  81-85  '87-'91  '92-'96
Infant  mortality
Poorest quintile  120  90  78  90  121  128  173  157  114  96  101
Third quintile  92  85  76  56  109  103  168  156  96  76  70
Richest quintile  74  48  55  45  88  73  102  98  81  38  47
Ratio Ql/Q5  1.6  1.9  1.4  2  1.4  1.8  1.7  1.6  1.4  2.5  2.1
Under-age-three  mortality
Poorestquintile  160  152  93  128  200  191  318  266  224  169  157
Thirdquintile  138  108  83  67  176  166  237  256  175  136  120
Richestquintile  113  80  60  54  135  85  184  148  114  60  66
Ratio Ql/Q5  1.4  1.9  1.6  2.4  1.5  2.2  1.7  1.8  2.0  2.8  2.4
Tanzania  Uganda  Zambia  Zimbabwe
Survey Year  1991  1996  1988  1995  1992  1997  1988  1994
Cohort at risk  '86-'90  '91-'95  '83-87  '90-'94  '87-'91  '92-'96  '81-'87  '89-93
Infant  mortality
Poorestquintile  114  116  141  107  134  143  66  57
Third quintile  97  89  115  100  129  101  69  54
Richest quintile  76  66  103  73  72  103  37  39
Ratio QJ/Q5  1.5  1.8  1.4  1.5  1.9  1.4  1.8  1.5
Under-age-three  mortality
Poorest quintile  156  144  189  182  217  224  84  71
Third quintile  152  138  184  168  187  184  92  70
Richest quintile  127  91  158  100  103  147  36  53
Ratio Ql/Q5  1.2  1.6  1.2  1.8  2.1  1.5  2.3  1.3
Source:  Sahn et al. (1999).
Income inequality
We turn now to income inequality and to the issue of whether episodes  of growth in the 1  990s in
Africa were associated  with widening income  distributions.  On the one hand, increasing reliance
on  markets  and  the  withdrawal  of the  state  might  be  expected  to  increase  income  inequality
(people with low levels of education,  and limited access to public services and markets being less
likely to take advantage  of the  opportunities growth  presents).  On the other hand,  the previous
tendency for the state to tax agriculture and the rural sector heavily,  and the removal of such state
intervention, might result in improved national income distributions.7
We present Gini coefficients,  a popular measure of inequality2, to describe how income inequality
evolved  in  our  selected  sample  of countries  (Table  5).  All  our  measures-except  for  urban
Ethiopia-are  based  on real  household  expenditures  per  adult  equivalent.3 The  surveys  were
designed  to  enable  comparisons  over  time  within  a  country,  though  due  to  different  survey
designs  caution  is  warranted  in  making  comparisons  across  countries.  Nonetheless,  the
differences  in the  degree  of income  inequality  in our sample  of countries  are  striking.  At one
extreme,  Zimbabwe  has  a  highly  unequal  distribution  (a  Gini  ratio  of over  0.6)4,  reflecting
unequal land distribution,  a result in part of its  colonial past.  Income  distributions in Ghana and
Uganda,  are far more egalitarian.
In terms of evolution, the general picture  is one of very little change  in overall income  inequality
in  these countries.  Reforms  and growth  have  clearly  not  led  to  a  significant  deterioration  in
consumption  inequality,  as  popular  belief  would  hold  (Forsyth,  2000).  Nevertheless,  these
aggregate  measures  of inequality  can be  misleading.  They  may  in  fact  mask  a  great  deal  of
distributional change, an issue we review further in section IV below.
2  Recall  that the Gini ratio varies from 0 (perfect income equality) to  I (perfect inequality).  The higher the
value, the greater the inequality.
3  While the actual measures are based on expenditures,  we use the terms 'income' and 'consumption'
interchangeably.
4  Intuitively,  the Gini index of a population represents  the expected income difference between two
randomly selected individuals  or households.  From Table 1 we know that in Zimbabwe  real average per
capita consumption  in 1996 amounted to US$461.  The corresponding  Gini index is 0.64  (Table  5).  Thus,
in 1996 the per capita consumption of any two randomly selected Zimbabweans  differed on average by
US$295 (= 0.64*US$461)-a clear indication  of high inequality given that average per capita consumption
is only US$461.8
Table 5: Consumption inequality(') during the 1990s in
selected African countries
Gini coefficient  Year I  Year 2  Change
Ethiopia  ()
1994-1997 (rural)  0.43  0.42  -0.01
1994-1997 (urban)  0.44  0.48  0.04
Ghana 1992-98
Rural  0.34  0.37  0.03
Urban  0.34  0.35  0.01
All  0.37  0.39  0.02
Madagascar  1993-99
Rural  0.42  0.36  -0.06
Urban  0.41  0.38  -0.03
All  0.43  0.38  -0.05
Mauritania  1987-95
Rural  0.43  0.37  -0.06
Urban  0.40  0.36  -0.04
All  0.43  0.39  -0.04
Uganda 1992-2000
Rural  0.33  0.32  -0.01
Urban  0.39  0.40  0.01
All  0.36  0.38  0.02
Zambia 1993-98
Rural  0.46  0.52  0.06
Urban  0.40  0.48  0.08
All  0.52  0.53  0.01
Zimbabwe 1991-96
Rural  0.58  0.57  -0.01
Urban  0.60  0.59  -0.01
All  0.68  0.64  -0.04
() Real expenditures per adult equivalent - real per capita expenditures for urban Ethiopia.
(2) Puiposively sarnpled villages and urban centers; not nationally representative.
Source: Country Studies under Dynamics of  Poverty study.
Trends in poverty during the 1990s
If growth  episodes  were  not associated  with significant  changes  in inequality,  did they lead to
poverty reduction?  Table  6 reports poverty estimates  for the countries  covered by the Poverty
Dynamics  study.  As  with  the  inequality  measures,  real  household  consumption  per  adult
equivalent  is taken  as the central  economic  welfare measure.  Poverty lines in all cases  (except
Mauritania)  are derived from a food consumption  basket,  estimated to yield a minimum caloric
intake, with adjustments  made for essential  non-food consumption.  We reiterate that because of
differences  in survey design, and in the specifics of how the welfare measure and poverty lines
are derived,  the data in Table 6 are not comparable  across  countries.  But the research has been
designed to ensure comparable estimates over time.9
Table 6:  Consumption poverty in eight African countries during in the 1990sl
Poverty headcount  (PO)  Severity index (PJ




1989-1995 (rural)  61  51  -16  17  12  -29
1994-1997 (rural)  39  29  -26  8  6  -25
1994-1997 (urban)  39  36  -8
Ghana
1992-1998  51  39  -24  9  7  -22
Madagascar
1993-97  70  73  4  17  19  12
1997-99  73  71  -3  19  19  0
Mauritania
1987-1995  58  35  -40  17  6  -65
Nigeria
1985-92  46  43  -7  8  9  13
1992-96  43  67  56  9  17  89
Uganda
1992-1997  56  44  -21  10  6  -40
1997-2000  44  35  -20  6  5  -16
Zambia
1993-1996  74  69  -7  30  22  -27
1996-1998  69  72  4  22  26  18
Zimbabwe
1991-1996  26  35  35  4  5  25
1)  Consumption measured as regionally deflated real household expenditure  per adult equivalent.  Poverty lines mostly calculated
according  to the cost of basic needs approach,  which includes an adjustment for non-food needs  (except for Zimbabwe).  Poverty
line for Mauritania based on US$1/day equivalent.  Poverty lines are country specific, so that the data are not comparable across
countries (only over time within countries).
2)  Based on respectively six and fifteen purposively  sampled rural villages for 1989-1995 and 1994-1997;  urban figures are based
on per capita household expenditures in seven large towns including Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa; not nationally  representative
Source:  World Bank data and country studies under Dynamics of  Poverty study
The poverty measures we report here  are derived  from the familiar class of poverty indices after
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984).  The general formula for these poverty measures is:
Pa  )  a  2  0(1
n  j=1  z
where  n is the  total population,  q the number of poor people,  yi the  income  (consumption)  of
individual i, z the poverty line,  and a a 'poverty aversion'  parameter.  The larger  is a, the greater
weight is placed  on the very poorest people.  If a  = 0, equation (1)  becomes simply qln, which is
the head-count ratio, or the incidence  of poverty.  Estimates of the headcount (PO)  are reported  in
the  first  data  panel  of Table  6.  Setting  a=2  involves  taking  the  square  of the  proportionate
poverty gap.  This measure (P2) is given in the second panel in Table 6, and is sometimes known10
as the severity index.  We report  this index because  it is  sensitive  to the distribution of income
among the poor.  It is particularly sensitive to changes  in the living standards of the poorest of the
poor.  The data suggest the following:
*  Most countries can be considered  as having to deal with 'mass' poverty.  Over 70 percent
were estimated to be poor in Madagascar  and Zambia.  And 67 percent of Nigerians were
estimated to be poor in 1996.
*  There  is no uniform  trend.  While consumption  poverty  incidence  declined substantially
in several countries (Ethiopia, Ghana,  Mauritania  and Uganda),  it rose sharply in Nigeria
and Zimbabwe.  In Madagascar and Zambia,  while fluctuating,  the poverty headcount has
remained largely unchanged.
*  Where the incidence of poverty has declined, the data suggest that the poorest sections of
the population  (in Lipton's phrase, the 'poorest of the poor') have also benefited.  This is
suggested by the significant downward trend in the severity index (P2).  In most cases, the
percentage fall in the P2 measure was greater than that in P0.
Poverty, inequality and economic growth
In some cases these changes in poverty occurred in a context of economic decline (Zimbabwe and
Nigeria,  and  Zambia  during  the  later period).  In  others  they  accompanied  overall  economic
progress (Ethiopia,  Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda).  To shed more light on the relation between
poverty,  inequality  and growth,  Table  7 presents  a decomposition of poverty incidence  into two
components:  changes explained by changes  in mean consumption  levels (keeping the distribution
of consumption  unchanged);  and changes  arising  from changing  consumption distribution  (with
the mean kept constant).  The poverty measure that is decomposed in the table is the elasticity of
headcount poverty with respect to changes  in mean household expenditure. 5
Overall,  changes  in poverty  incidence  are  due predominantly  to  changes  in mean  expenditure.
Where there has been economic growth, both mean and redistribution effects have the same sign,
and have combined to reduce poverty (in Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda).  But, the mean effect
largely dominates the redistribution effect.  In contrast, where there has been recession, mean and
redistribution effects have opposite signs,  and the redistribution  effect substantially  rnitigates  the
poverty  increasing  impact  of  lower  mean  incomes  (Madagascar  and  Zimbabwe).  Better-offI1
groups  clearly  bear  a  heavier  burden  of income  losses  during  periods  of economic  decline  in
Africa.6
Table 7:  Relative importance of mean and distribution in the evolution  of poverty
incidence
Percentage  change in  Percentage  Poverty  Explained  by chaniges in: *
mean per capita  change in  Elasticity
expenditure  poverty  wrt mean  Mean  Distribution
headcount  expenditure
Ghana
1992-1998  23.7  -23.5  -0.99  -0.93  -0.06
Madagascar
1993-1997  -17.5  4.7  -0.27  -0.77  0.50
1997-1999  0.6  -2.7  -4.51  -0.79  -3.72
Mauritania
1987-1995  49.5  -39.7  -0.82  -0.74  -0.07
Uganda
1992-1997  17.1  -21.4  -1.21  -1.C07  -0.15
Zimbabwe
1991-1996  -28.8  34.6  -1.23  -2.22  0.99
* Decompositions  based  on Kakwani and Pemia (2000);
Source:  World Bank data and country studies under Dynamics of Poverty study.
To assess further  the  extent to which these  episodes  of growth and recession  are  'pro-poor'  we
follow Kakwani and Pemia (2000) in defining,
0 =  7
77g
where  i7 is  the  observed elasticity  of  headcount  poverty  with  respect  to  changes  in  mean
expenditure,  and  17g is the elasticity of headcount poverty assuming the distribution of income did
not change  during the period.  0 can be defined  as an index of 'pro-poor ,growth.'  Growth can be
considered pro-poor  if 4 >  1.7  Table  8  compares  estimates of 4)  for these  five African countries
with recent  experience  in Asia.  On the basis  of this  sample of countries,  growth  and recession
episodes in Africa have tended to be pro-poor,  and indeed more so than the Asian experience.
'  This is defined as the proportionate  change  in headcount poverty divided by the proportionate  change in
mean per capita household expenditure.  For details  of the method used see Kakwani and Pernia (2000).
6  The tendency for income inequality to narrow as higher income groups bear the brunt of economic
recession was also noted by Grootaert  (1996)  in analyzing poverty changes in Cote d'Ivoire in the 1980s.
7 When mean household expenditures  are declining,  P= Tlg/T1,  so that a recession would also be considered
pro-poor if 4  > 1.12
Table 8:  Pro-poor growth indices (0) in selected  African and Asian countries
Growth  episodes:
Ghana, 1992-1998  1.07  Thailand,  1992-1996  0.61
Mauritania,  1987-1995  1.10  Lao PDR,  1993-1998  0.21
Uganda,  1992-1997  1.14  Korea, 1990-1996  1.03
Recession/stagnaden  episodes:
Madagascar,  1993-1997  2.85  Thaland,  1996-98  0.73
Zinbabwe,  1991-1996  1.81  Korea, 1997-1998  0.84
For details of method see text.
Asian country estimates are simnple means across years within the sub-period shown.
Sources:  Table 7; Kakwani and Pemia (2000).
There  is  evidence  from  international  cross  section  data  that  initial  income  inequality  can  be
harmful  for subsequent  growth and poverty reduction  (Alesina and Rodrik,  1994; Temple,  1999;
Ravallion,  2001).  Initial (income or asset) inequality tends to affect growth itself, with countries
with  lower  initial  inequality  typically  growing  more rapidly  in subsequent  years.  In  addition,
initial  inequality  reduces  the poverty impact of subsequent growth.  If initial inequality is large,
the poor  find themselves  often further  away from the poverty  line and income  increases  (even
when equi-proportionate)  are less likely to lift them out of poverty.
The  experience  of this  (albeit  small)  sample  of African  countries  is  consistent with this  view
(Figure  1).  The  countries that had lower  levels  of initial  inequality (as  evidenced  by the  Gini
ratios), were more likely to experience  declines in poverty in subsequent  years.  That said,  it is
worth noting that the three  countries with identical  initial year Gini ratios (of 0.43)-Ethiopia,
Mauritania, and Madagascar -experienced  subsequent annual poverty changes of (respectively)
-8.7, -5.0, and +0.3  percent.  While the broad pattern across countries suggests that higher levels
of inequality are  associated with lower subsequent  growth and poverty reduction,  there is also a
lot of variation around this empirical regularity to counsel caution.13
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MI.  Growth and systematic  changes in income  distribution: a macro perspective
Our review of the evidence  so far suggests that growth has been pro-poor in the African countries
under  study.  These changes  have occurred during an era of economnic  policy reform, institutional
change  and  important  internal  and  external  shocks,  such  as  droughts,  disease,  and  fluctuating
commodity prices.  These events have effects at all levels-they influence the growth rate of the
economy at large, they affect the functioning of markets and of government,  they change village
and  community  life,  and  they  impinge  directly  on  the  lives  of households  and  individuals.
Understanding  how  these  changes  have  influenced  poverty  outcomes  therefore  calls  for
knowledge at both the macro (economy-wide)  and micro (household/individual)  levels.  And this
is the approach we take here.  First, we assess how macro changes  (in economic and institutional
environments)  have  affected  poverty  outcomes.  This  provides  the  context  in  which  we  then
review  (in  section  IV)  the microeconomic  evidence  linking  poverty  outcomes  to  policies  and
shocks.
Macro-economic  reforms andpoverty  trends
We  begin  by reviewing  the  relationship  between  macroeconomic  policy  reforms  and  income
poverty.  To  do  so,  we  elaborate  and  update  the  analysis  of Demery  and Squire  (1997)  who
examined  the  empirical  association  between  improvements  in  macroeconomic  balances  and14
poverty reduction based on data of the late  1980s  and the early  1990s.  With better comparable
household  data  now  available  (including  emerging  panel  data),  and  with  another  decade  of
economic  reform in many countries8, we are in a good position to revisit this issue.
Following  Bouton et  al  (1994)  we calculate  a macroeconomic  policy  index  or score,  based on
changes  in three  key elements  of sound macroeconomic  policy:  fiscal,  monetary,  and exchange
rate  policy.  The  overall  macro-policy  score  is  a weighted  average  of these  components,  the
weights  being  derived  from  international  cross  section  growth  regressions.  These  scores  are
computed  for  the  three-year  period  prior  to  each  survey,  and  changes  in  the  index  are  then
compared.  The index is so computed that increases in the score (either  lower negative values  or
higher positive values) indicate an improvement in economic  policy (Table 9).
Table 9:  Changes in macro-economic  policy scores,  selected  countries
Change  Fiscal  Monetary  Exchange rate  Average Score
during.  policy  policy  policy  Unweighted  Weighted
C6te d'Ivoire  1985-88  -2  1  -2  -1.0  -1.7
Ethiopia  1989-95  -1  -0.5  2.5  0.7  1.0
1994-97  2  1.5  2.5  2.0  2.2
Ghana  1988-92  -I  1.5  2  0.8  0.8
1992-98  0  -0.5  0.5  0.0  0.2
Madagascar  1993-97  0.0  -0.5  0.0  -0.2  -0.1
1997-99  1.0  1.0  0.0  0.7  0.5
Mauritania  1987-95  3  0.5  2.5  2.0  2.4
Nigeria  1985-92  1  -1  3  1.0  1.8
1992-96  1  -I  -2.5  -0.8  -1.0
Uganda  1992-97  2  1.5  -0.5  1.0  0.7
1997-00  0  0.5  0.5  0.3  0.3
Zambia  1993-96  2  2  0.5  1.5  1.2
1996-98  1  1  -1  0.3  0.0
Zimbabwe  1991-96  -1  -0.5  1.5  0.0  0.3
Sources:  Demery and Squire (1997);  authors'  computations  from World Bank data.
Given weaknesses in the underlying survey data, we prefer not to retain two countries included in
the original  Demery and Squire  piece (Tanzania  and Kenya).  For Ethiopia,  Ghana and Nigeria,
we  update  the  estimates  by  introducing  trends  in  the  1990s.  Finally,  we  add  the  cases  of
Madagascar,  Mauritania,  Uganda,  Zambia and Zimbabwe,  giving altogether a coverage  of fifteen
episodes  of  change  in  nine  countries.  Most  countries  experienced  improvements  in  their
macroeconomic  policy  indicators-those for the second period (i.e.  the three-year period prior to
the second survey)  being generally better than those of the earlier period (the three years prior to
8  The data used in many previous assessments  were often of doubtful quality and given the lags involved in
implementing the reforms, the 1  990s might be a more appropriate  decade to examnine the growth path
induced by economnic  policy reforms in Africa (Collier and Gunning,  1997).15
the first survey).  But there were only marginal improvements  in Ghana (1]992-98)  and Zimbabwe
(1991-96),  and no change in Zambia during  1996-98.  Macroeconomic  destabilization is observed
in two countries-C6te  d'Ivoire during the  1980s, and Nigeria in the  1990s.
Setting  these against the trends in poverty reduction  (Figure 2)  confirms that countries  achieving
improvements  in their macroeconomic  balances  in Africa typically  have not experienced  (in the
aggregate  at  least)  increases  in  consumption  poverty-rather  the  reverse.9 Ten  of the  fifteen
episodes  of change  for  which we  have  data  indicate both macroeconomic  policy  improvement
and subsequent poverty reduction.  In the two cases where macroeconomic balances  substantially
deteriorated,  poverty  is  indicated  to  have  increased.  Only  one  of  the  fifteen  observations
(Zimbabwe  during  1991-96)  is  in the  'wrong'  quadrant  in  Figure  2  (improved  macroeconomic
policy and increased poverty).
The  association between  the  macro-policy  stance  and  poverty  reduction  does  not  necessarily
imply any causative  or direct behavioral link.'°  Rather this evidence serves to highlight the close
interactions  between macroeconomic  policies  and economic  well-being  at the  household  level.
The changes  in the macroeconomic  accounts took place alongside  other sectoral reforms-mostly
of a 'structural'  nature  (trade  liberalization,  agricultural  marketing reforms, privatization,  and so
on)-and  changing  institutional  environments.  Both  the  institutional  environment  and  the
sectoral reforms  are  certain to be important as  well, as is illustrated by the fact that quite similar
poverty reductions occurred  among some of the countries  despite quite different  changes in their
macro-economic  indicators (see  south-east quadrant  in Figure 2).
9 Ali (1998) gets quite different results, with reforms  being associated with increasing poverty.  This is
probably due to the different poverty data sets he uses (derived from IFAD data).  Our concern here has
been to use only data where careful attention has been paid to over time comparability.  Without further
information about Ali's data, it is difficult to establish the specific  reasons for the differences  in results.
'1 Both poverty changes and macro-policy scores might be favorably affected by a third factor,  movements
in the terms of trade,  for example.16
Figure 2: Macroeconomic  policy reform and poverty trends
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Institutional change andpoverty trends
There is an accumulation of convincing empirical evidence pointing to the importance of political
stability  and  good  governance  for growth  and  poverty  reduction  (Alesina  and  Perotti,  1994;
Knack  and  Anderson,  1995;  Collier,  1999;  World  Bank,  2001).  While  the  construction  and
consolidation  of  good  indicators  of political  stability  and  good  governance  remain  work  in
progress, the composite political risk index of the International  Country Risk Guide (ICRG), and
subsets thereof, have been frequently used by researchers to exarnine the effect of govemance and
institutional  quality  on  growth  and poverty.  The composite  index  consists  of 12  components
covering  different  aspects  of  political  stability  (for  example,  government  stability,  internal
conflict,  external  conflict),  governance  and  institutional  quality  (for  example,  corruption,
democratic  accountability,  bureaucracy  quality).  The key  advantage  of the  ICRG  index is  its
broad  coverage  across countries  and over time (1985  to curTent).tl  Evaluations  of the  different
aspects of the index are provided by a private consultancy.
" The different cornponents of the ICRG political risk index (miaximwn scores in brackets) are govermnent
stability (12),  socio-econonmic  conditions (12),  investmnent profile (12),  internal conflict (12), external
conflict (  12), corruption ( 12), military in politics (6), religion in politics (6), law and order (6), ethnic
tensions (6), democratic  accountability (6), bureaucracy quality (4).  The maximumn score is 100 with a17
We find an  improvement in the political risk score during all episodes of poverty change covered
by the Poverty Dynamics study.'2 In Ethiopia (1989-95)  the improvement  followed largely from
reduced risk  of internal  and  external  conflict  following peace  agreements  with  Eritrea.  Better
overall  governance  (as captured by the corruption,  law and order,  democratic  accountability and
bureaucratic  quality indices),  as well as greater  government  stability and reduced risk of internal
conflicts  drove  progress  in  institutional  quality  in  Ghana  (1992-98)  and  Uganda  (1992-97).
Increased government  stability was responsible  for the change in Madagascar.  And in Zimbabwe
(1991-96) the improvement followed from reduced risk of an external  conflict,  a result of the end
of the Cold War and the peace process in neighboring Mozambique.
Plotting  the  changes  in  the  average  annual  political  risk  scores  of the  survey  years  of  our
countries  against  annual  changes  in  the  observed  poverty  incidence  (Figure  3)  suggests  that
improvements  in political  stability  and  governance  are  generally  associated  with  reductions  in
poverty,  though  experiences  vary across  countries." 3 In  eight  out of the  eleven  episodes  these
improvements  were  accompanied  by poverty  reduction.  In  one episode  we observe  almost  no
change  in  poverty  (Madagascar)  and  in  two  other  cases  (Nigeria  and  Zimbabwe)  poverty
increased.  In Nigeria the  recorded  improvement  in the  institutional  environment  was  marginal
(3.3  points)  and  was  in  all  likelihood  swamped  by the  adverse  effects  of the macroeconomic
deterioration  in the  1991-96 period.  The other exception,  Zimbabwe,  is more  of a  puzzle.  The
macroeconomic  balances  also  improved  during  this  episode  of poverty  increase,  so  where  did
things go wrong?  The answer to this cannot be provided here, but the very high initial  inequality
in  Zimbabwe  was a  particularly  serious challenge  for  growth  and poverty  reduction  during  the
decade.  We discuss the Zimbabwe episode of poverty increase in further detail below.
political risk score below 49.9 indicating very high risk; a score between 50 and 59.9 high risk; 60 to 69.9
moderate risk; 70 to 79.9 low risk; and 80  or more very low risk.  Similarly, a score of 49.9 percent or
below on an individual risk component,  would imply that the cornponent can be considered as very high
risk, a score in 50 to 59.9 percent range as high risk, and so on.  For a detailed description of the ICRG
rating system  we refer to htto://www.icrzonline.comnicrgMethods.asp.
12 In all, eleven episodes  of institutional change were examined.  Political risk scores for our survey periods
were not available  for Mauritania  and C6te d'Ivoire and we only retained  one episode for Madagascar
(1993-1999)  and Zambia (1993-1998)  given the short time span in between their second and third survey
rounds.
'3 Using two year averages of the survey year and the year prior to the survey year to account for lags in the
effect of institutional  change on poverty does not change the results.  Our findings are also robust to the use
of a subset of the political risk indicator focusing on indicators of political stability (government  stability,18
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While our measures of political stability and the quality of governance  are admittedly crude, these
findings would  support  the  general  observation  that  increased  political  stability  and  improved
governance  go  hand  in hand  with poverty  reduction.  Nevertheless,  many  difficult  questions
remain to be resolved.  Which of the different  components of institutional  change (for example,
political,  economic,  civil rights  or social  stability),  have had the most significant  impact?  And
what  is the direction of causality and the channels through which institutional  improvements  and
poverty reduction may affect each other (Aron, 2000)?  These fall beyond the scope of  this study.
IV.  Growth and systematic  changes in income distribution: a micro-perspective
The  evidence  from  the  African  experience  covered  in  this  study  indicates  that  growth  (and
recession)  have  been  pro-poor.  Yet,  this  conclusion  must be  qualified-it  is true  only  in an
aggregate  sense.  Further  decomposition  of  national  inequality  and  poverty  measures-by
geographical  location  and  socio-economic  group-indicates  that the  aggregate  statistics  often
mask a wide variety of experience.  Some groups and regions gained disproportionately  from the
newly created opportunities  following  economic  reforms,  while others lost out or even became
impoverished.  Similarly,  overall  Gini  coefficients  often  appear  stable  over  time  despite
substantial  churning  within  and  across  geographical  regions as illustrated  by the  experience  in
Ghana  and  Zambia  (discussed  below).  This  suggests  that  the  positive  association  between
intemal conflict, external  conflict) and governance (corruption, law and order, democratic accountability
and bureaucratic quality).19
improved  macro-environments  and  poverty  reduction  is  conditioned  by  other  factors  such  as
location  and infrastructure,  households'  private  and public  endowments,  and the  occurrence  of
shocks.
To  disentangle  the  effects  of these  disparate  events  and  factors  on  the  different  sections  of
African  society  it is  tempting  to  use  economy-wide  modeling  techniques  which  can  generate
counterfactuals,  and  provide  insights  into  the respective  impacts  of policies  and  other  shocks.
Much  of the  serious  work  to  date  on policy reform  and poverty  in  Africa  has relied  on such
modeling  approaches  (Bourguignon  and  Morrison,  1992;  Sahn  et  al,  1997).  Yet  despite  their
strengths,  these  approaches  also have  a number of important  limitations.  The models typically
impose a strong structure which sometimes leads to questions about their realism.  They are most
often calibrated at one point  in time.  As  a result,  they cannot always  confidently track changes
over time-the economic history.  Indeed, such history usually involves policy-induced  structural
changes  in the economy that are not captured in such experiments.
Exploiting  different  experiences  across households,  this  section  places  emphasis  instead  on the
micro-econometric  evidence  emerging  from the much improved  and richer household survey data
sets.  We begin by highlighting  two Poverty Dynamics studies-Dercon  (2001)  on Ethiopia, and
Deininger  and  Okidi  (2001)  on Uganda.  These  are  particularly  informative  for  two  reasons.
First, both involve the use of panel data, which track changes  in the living standards of the same
households  over much of the  1990s.  Although  not identical,  both the methodologies  they adopt
and their results are similar.
Second, both countries experienced  far-reaching reforms in economic policy, inducing changes in
market  institutions,  relative  prices  and  producer  responses.  The  rural  sector  in  Ethiopia  had
previously been largely ignored and heavily taxed.  But agricultural  reforms initiated in the early
1990s  included  the  abolition  of food  delivery  quota  for  farmers,  and  a relaxation  (and  later
abolition)  of restrictions  on private grain trades.  These  measures substantially reduced  the food
marketing margins  between  surplus  and deficit  regions.  The Birr was devalued  by  142 percent
and  the  foreign exchange  markets  liberalized.  This positively  affected  the  farm-gate  prices  of
tradables, such as coffee and chat, though the effect was somewhat muted due to the existence  of
parallel markets.  Producer prices for coffee  evolved favorably during the period, partly because
of an increase in the world price.20
Uganda's rural sector lost considerable  ground during the period up to  1985.  Adversely affected
by  state  intervention,  civil  strife  and  agricultural  price  disincentives  (through  overvalued
exchange rates and the implicit taxation of state marketing  boards), rural producers retreated into
subsistence.  The production of cotton, tea and coffee suffered accordingly.  From the late  1980s
on, government policy changed,  dismantling the biases against rural producers.  Coffee marketing
and exports  were  liberalized,  and direct export taxation  was  abandoned.  Similar measures  were
taken in the cotton sector.  The foreign  exchange market was liberalized,  leading to real exchange
rate depreciation.  The  weighted  real producer  price  of export crops  in  Uganda  (77 percent  of
which are coffee)  increased by 78 percent between  1989-91  and 1995-97.  Decomposition of this
increase indicates that changes in the nominal protection coefficient (producer price/border price),
changes in the real exchange  rate, and changes in the real world price contributed respectively  58,
9  and  11  percent  (Townsend,  1999).  Over  the past  decade,  agricultural  output has  recovered,
averaging  between  4  to 4.5  percent  per  annum  in real  terms.  And  this  growth  has played  an
important role in reducing poverty (Appleton et al,  1999).
In  sum,  economic  policy  reforms  in  both  Ethiopia  and  Uganda  had  significant  effects  on
agricultural markets  and the prices farmers received for both food and export crops.  At the  same
time,  however,  the  period witnessed  other changes,  including  rainfall  variation.  Both  Dercon
(2001)  and Deininger and  Okidi (2001)  use the panel data to assess how these different changes
affected  household  incomes  and  consumption,  and rural poverty.  Focusing on the  factors  they
highlight  as key for economic  growth  and poverty reduction,  we then  assess the evidence  from
the  other  case  studies  which  use  either  repeated  cross  sectional  regressions  (Zimbabwe,
Madagascar,  Ghana)  or simply an extensively documented narrative  linking the macro-events to
the observed evolutions  in household welfare (Zambia and Mauritania).
Dercon  (2001)  uses panel data from six rural  communities  in Ethiopia covering the period  1989
to  1995.  The  change  in household  real consumption  per adult  is explained  through  a reduced
form  regression  model  derived  from  an Oaxaca-Blinder  type  decomposition.  In  this  approach
changes  in consumption  and poverty can be explained by changes in endowments  over time and
changes  in  returns  to  endowments.  The main  regressors  were  changes  in real  crop producer
prices (which Dercon shows to be closely related to the macro-economic  and agricultural reforms
that  were  implemented  during  the  period),  location  (proxied  by  distance  to  an  urban  center),
access to roads, private  endowments (land, labor and education), and two shock variables, rainfall
and ill health.  His results are summarized in Table  10.21
Household consumption  increased on average by 32 percent between  1989 and 1995, and poverty
incidence decreased by 29 percentage  points.  The growth  in rural household incomes  have been
largely fueled by changes  in relative  crop prices'4 and increased  returns to location and access to
road  infrastructure.  This  is  clearly  illustrated  by  Dercon's  simulations  which  show  that
consumption would have declined by  13 percent and poverty would have increased  by 23 percent
had  there  been no  peace  and  no  economic  and  agricultural  reforms." 5 Interestingly,  all  poor
households  (even  those  who  fell  into  poverty)  benefited  from  the  relative  price  changes  that
occurred.  But  those  who  escaped  poverty  benefited  most.  These  findings  suggest  that  the
reforms  and  increased  political  stability  substantially  improved  well-being  of the  poor,  both
directly through  a  favorable  change  in relative  prices,  and  indirectly  through an increase  in the
returns  to  market  connectedness  as  determined  by  road  infrastructure  and  distance  to  urban
centers.
In  addition to public endowments  such  as road infrastructure  and  location,  private  endowments
are also found to be important  for consumption  growth and poverty reduction.  Increases  in land
holdings or the quality of the land  owned,  and in adult labor reduced  poverty by  14 percentage
16 points.  Returns to land also increased,'7 but because the poor typically possess little (and often
low-potential)  land,  they  profited  much  less  than  the  average  household  from  the  increased
returns to land.  Finally, the occurrence of shocks (especially rainfall,  but also illness shocks) had
a large negative  effect both on the growth process and poverty  outconmes.  If households had had
access  to full  insurance protection  from rainfall  and health shocks, poverty  would have declined
by 42 percentage  points compared  with 29 percentage  points in its absence.  Dercon  shows that
the  main reason why  households  fell  into  poverty during this  period was mainly  the  combined
effects  of the  rainfall  and  illness  shock.  Agricultural  marketing  reforms  are  shown  to  have
benefited even the households  that lost ground  during the period.
14  These reflect mainly changes in food crop prices.  Coffee prices also improved, yet it was grown in only
one of the six sarnpled villages, and the coffee harvest had failed that year in that particular village because
of a pest attack and drought.  The effect of changing export crop prices cannot be evaluated from this
sample,  but its importance has been assessed explicitly in the Uganda case study described below.
'5 Dercon (1995)  shows that the cereal marketing  margins mainly improved because of the liberalization of
the grain markets and only on some routes did the end of the war have a significant effect.
16  Adult education levels are extremely low,  less than I year per adult, and they are assumed not to have
changed.  The effect of education as such, as opposed to changes in returns to education, has thus not been
evaluated in this study.
17  As the direct effect of changing producer prices has been controlled for, changes  in returns to land result
from other factors such as shifts in the underlying production technology potentially induced by the
reforms.22
In  sum,  households  that  escaped  poverty  during  the  period  not  only  benefited  from  better
producer prices, they also enjoyed a more favorable location, and were endowed with good access
to infrastructure  and better land.  Those  who remained poor or who  fell into poverty,  did so in
part  because  they were  badly  placed  in  terms  of location  and  land.  They  were  also  at  the
receiving end of particularly bad luck-they suffered most from poor rainfall and from ill health.
Table 10:  Ethiopia, decomposition  of consumption growth per adult and poverty gap ratio
(percentage points)
Actual  Counterfactual:  Counterfactual:
No reform & peace  No risk
Growth  Poverty  Growth  Poverty  Growth  Poverty
Real crop price change  15  -18  15  -16
Change returns to road  19  -23  19  -21
infrastructure/location
Private  endowments
Increase in land  7  -10  1  -2  7  -8
Changeinreturnstoland  3  0  3  -I
Increases in adult labor  3  -4  3  -4  3  -4
Changes in retums to educated adults  0  0  0  0
Change in adult equivalent units  -5  7  -5  7  -5  7
Shocks
Relative rainfall shock  -8  13  -8  14
Illness shocks  4  5  -4  5
Residual  0  0  0  3  0  0
Percentage growth and percentage point  32  -29  -13  23  42  -44
poverty change (sum of above)
Source:  Dercon (2001)
Deininger and Okidi (2001)  analyze changes in consumption  and income observed for a panel of
about  1,200  Uganda  households  during  the  period  1992-2000.  They  regress  household  level
changes  in  consumption  and  income  against  variables  representing  the  change  in  relative
producer prices of coffee,  their access to  infrastructure,  their initial  endowments of physical  and
human capital,  the initial health  status of households,  and their social capital.  They  found these
variables to be significant in explaining growth in Ugandan household  incomes during the 1990s.
As in Ethiopia, the effect of changes in relative prices (in this case an increase in farm-gate coffee
prices  largely brought about by market liberalization,  but also by the  devaluation and favorable
world prices) on consumption growth was substantial.
Initial  private  endowments  of education  and  other  assets  (mainly  land)  were  also  crucial  for
consumption  growth.  For  example,  if households  had had  6 years  of completed  schooling  on23
average  (instead of the observed  3 years)-equivalent  to completing  primary schooling-growth
in  consumption  would  have  been  2  percentage  points  higher.  A  difference  of one  standard
deviation  in  terms  of initial  asset  value  (about  half of which  is  accounted  for  by  land)  put
households on a 2 percentage  point higher consumption  growth path.  Households  which  in  1992
were  afflicted by health problems-related  to malaria in over  80 percent of cases-experienced
consumption  growth which was (other things constant)  1.8 percentage  points lower than those not
experiencing  such problems.  Households with  access to electricity enjoyed  consumption growth
that was 6 percentage points higher than other households.
The  above  results  offer  insight  into  what  determined  the  growth  in  income  and  consumption
among  Ugandan  households.  How did such  growth affect poverty?  To address  this, Deininger
and  Okidi  estimate  a  multinomial  logit  model  of changes  in  poverty  status  (households  are
classified  as either not changing their status, falling into poverty or escaping from poverty).  They
find that the relative  coffee price changes had a powerful poverty-reducing  impact, indicating that
their  effect  was  broad-based  and  that price  changes  in tradable  commodities  directly benefited
poor producers (and not simply  indirectly through the labor market.)  Moreover, households with
higher  education,  more  initial  assets  (land),  better  health,  and  better  access  to  infrastructure
(electricity)  and  location  (distance  to municipality)  were  far  less  likely than  others  to  fall  into
poverty,  and more likely to escape from it.
These results from these micro-econometric  analyses of panel data point to the following  factors
that appear to influence the relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction:
*  First,  many rural  households  stand  to benefit  directly  from  liberalization  measures,  as
well  as  increased  political  stability  and  better  governance.  And  the  gains  can  be
substantial.  In so far as liberalization measures  increase producer prices, rural producers
will gain, and to the extent that food marketing  margins tend to decline, rural consumers
will  gain  as  well.  Nonetheless,  some  will  gain  more  than  others,  depending  on  the
product- and consumption-mix of the household.
*  Second,  a household's  location  is also  key  in conditioning  the  extent to  which  it  will
benefit  from liberalization measures.  Specifically,  whether  the household  had access  to
infrastructure  and  urban  markets  was  an immensely  important  factor  in  governing  the
growth in household  income.  It explains  about  half of household  consumption  growth
and  poverty  reduction  in  Ethiopia  during  1989-95,  and  it  was  also  quantitatively24
important  for  growth  in Uganda  household  income.  So,  connectedness  to markets  as
captured by access to infrastructure (especially roads, but also electricity) and distance to
urban centers  is likely to be  a major factor  in determining  how growth  in  any country
transmits it benefits to the population.
*  Third,  the potential  for  economic  growth and poverty  reduction  further  depends  on  a
household's  private  endowments.  Households  with larger  private  endowments-be  it
more  and  better qualified  labor or  land-not  only tend  to be  less poor,  they  are  also
better  placed  to  profit  from  new  opportunities  generated  by  liberalization  and
institutional  change.
*  Finally, it is vital to  separate out the effect of shocks when assessing  the role of policy
changes.  Dercon  highlights  rainfall  and health  shocks,  both of which are certain to be
relevant to poor households  in most African countries.  The importance of health is also
underscored by Deininger and Okidi for the Ugandan case.
We now examine  the evidence  on distribution and poverty changes  in other countries  covered  in
this review, looking for echoes of the findings from the panel data of Ethiopia and Uganda.
Distribution,  poverty  and  liberalization
The  changes  in  relative  prices  through  exchange  rate  devaluations,  the  opening  of  domestic
markets,  and  changes  in  the  structure  of production  are  certain  to  lead  to  shifts  in  income
distribution, with producers of tradable goods (mostly exportables)  benefiting from the economic
policy reforms.  The Ugandan and Ethiopian  studies  show that these effects were evident  during
the  1990s,  and that they  directly benefited  poor households.  The  experience  of Ghana in West
Africa  echoes  these East African  findings.  Ghana  experienced  sharp poverty reductions  among
cash (export)  crop producers  during the 1  990s, a result of more favorable world cocoa prices and
an increase  in cocoa production.  Table  11  compares  trends in poverty among crop producers  in
rural Uganda and Ghana.
In both countries  about two  fifths of the population  are  food-producing farmers,  of whom about
two  thirds  were  poor  in  the  early  1990s.  And  in  both  countries,  poverty  fell  among  food
producers, but the decline was not as great as that experienced by export crop producers.  Most of
the  rural  poor  appear  to  have  benefited  from  growth,  but  those  producing  export crops  have25
benefited most.  A much larger share of the population in Uganda  grows cash crops (21  percent)
than  in  Ghana  (6  percent)  which  may  explain  the  larger  drop  in  poverty  amongst  food  crop
producers  in  Uganda.  Reviewing  the  existing  evidence  on  the  experience  with  agricultural
reforms in sub-Saharan Africa, Kherallah et al (2000) arrive at a similar conclusion-export-crop
producers  seem to  have  benefited  more  than  food  crop  producers.  What  needs  to  be  better
understood  is  the  transmission mechanism  that  led  to  economic  gains  of  households  not
producing for export.
Table 11:  Poverty incidence by rural activity, Ghana and Uganda in the 1990s.
Uganda:  Ghana.
Population  1992  2000  Percent  Population  1992  1998  Percent
share (2000)  reduction  share (1998)  reduction
Foodcrop  45.9  63.3  45.7  -27.8  43.9  68.1  59.4  -12.8
Cash crop  21.3  62.7  29.7  -52.6  6.3  64.0  38.7  -39.5
Source:  World Bank, Poverty Dynamics studies.
Potential pathways  include rural labor markets,  with higher export crop prices stimulating  export
crop  production  leading  to  increased  demand  for  agricultural  wage  labor and  ultimately higher
agricultural real wages.  Abdulai and Delgado (2000) find that in Ghana a 1 percent change in the
domestic terms of trade between  agriculture and non-agriculture  leads to a 0.83 percent change in
the real agricultural  wage  rate in the long run,  underscoring  the importance of labor markets in
transmitting  the  effects  of  economic  reforms.  Increased  liquidity  in  rural  economies  from
agricultural  exports  can  also  have  important  spin-off  effects,  through  an  expansion  of both
investment in export and food crop production,  and increased  consumption of goods and services
produced  with previously  underutilized  local labor, land or capital.  As a rule of thumb Delgado
et  al.  (1998)  posit  that  any  policy  enhancing  producers'  income  from  agricultural  exports
increases local rural income by twice the amount of the increased exports.
To  understand  the  different  evolution  in  poverty  among  food-  and  cash-crop  producers,  it  is
important to keep in mind that the former  group tends  to be much more heterogeneous  than the
latter.  In  export-crop  growing  zones,  the  effects  of  favorable  export  crop  prices  were  also
transmitted  to the  food-crop  growing  households-either  through  the labor market  or the  input
and product  markets,  or both.  Transmission  of such benefits to areas  unsuitable for export crop
production,  especially  when they  are also remote, is much harder.  For example,  in Ghana  food
producers  in more  remote and less integrated  regions (in the  north) did not experience a similar
reduction  in their poverty  as food growers  in cash-crop  (and better integrated)  areas.  Similarly,26
food  crop  producers  in  northem  Uganda,  which  is  also  less  accessible,  appear  not  to  have
benefited from recent growth.
Periods  of economnic  stagnation  and recession also systematically  affect some  groups more than
others.  In Zimbabwe,  for example, the increase in rural poverty during  1990/91  and 1995/96 was
felt  most keenly  among  the commercial  farmers  (Table  12).  Disentangling  exactly  why  some
suffered more than others is a difficult undertaking.  Some farmers might have suffered more than
others from the drought (an issue taken up by Alwang  and Mills, 2001  and discussed below).  It is
also  likely  that  the  fall  in incomes  among  commercial  farmers  was  due  to  the  decline  in  real
tobacco prices,  estimated by Townsend  (1999)  to be  -2.5  percent per  annum  during  1990 and
1996/97.  Other features  of real price changes during the period identified by Townsend (notably
the  increase  in  the  real  price  of cotton  and  continued  government  intervention  in  the  maize
market) may also explain why the smallholder  group of farmers have not suffered  as much as the
commercial  farmers during this episode of drought and economic decline.
Table 12:  Zimbabwe, incidence of rural  poverty by farming category,  1991-1996
Expenditure  /adult equivalent  1990/91  1995/96  Percentage  change in:
Mean  Mean
consumption  Poverty  consumption  Poverty  Mean  Poverty
(Z$ 1990/month)  headcount  (Z$ 1990/month)  headcount  consumption headcount
Communal  65.54  38.5  50.17  52  -0.23  35.1
Small scale commercial  93.15  18.7  65.95  34.4  -0.29  84.0
Large scale commercial  99.21  16.3  76.85  27.4  -0.23  68.1
Resettlement areas  57.51  47  46.47  50.6  -0.19  7.7
Rural  69.6  35.8  54.29  48  -0.22  34.08
Source: Alwang and Ersado (1999)
Distribution, poverty and location
The panel analysis of Ethiopian and Ugandan households  provides  strong empirical evidence  that
location is important in determining how  growth influences  income distribution.  Other countries
also experienced  strongly divergent pattems in inequality  across regions.  In Ghana, for example,
inequality fell  sharply in Accra, Urban  Savannah, and Rural Forest,  while it increased  sharply in
the Coastal zone and Rural  Savannah.  The stability in the overall Gini in Zambia (at just over 0.5
in  1993  and  1998)  also  gives  a  misleading  impression  of  little  distribution  change.  In  fact
consumption inequality  increased sharply in both urban and rural areas.  But because mean living
standards  improved in rural relative  to urban  areas, the overall  Gini remained  unchanged  (Table27
5).  Our  conclusion  then  is  that  overall  indices  of inequality  can  mask  important  changes  in
distribution-particularly  across and within geographic regions.
Geography is even more important  in explaining poverty trends.  In some countries the decline in
poverty is observed in both the rural and urban areas (Uganda, Mauritania, Ghana-Table  13).  In
others, the change is confined mainly to rural areas (Zambia between  1993-1996).  It is clear from
the  case  studies  that both  within  the rural  and  the urban  sectors,  poverty  changes  have  varied
considerably depending on geographical location.  Some geographical  areas have not benefited as
much as others from growth, and some have even lost ground during the period of recovery.  The
different experience  in the evolution of poverty  seems  closely related to the extent to which the
region  or  village  is  integrated  within  the  overall  economy.  The  experiences  of Ghana  and
Madagascar are illustrative.
Table 13:  Headcount poverty trends in rural and urban areas of six African
countries
Rural  Urban
Population.  Year I  Year2  Change  Yearl  Year2  Change
share in
year I ('Y)  (%/)  (M)  N  (N)  (%)  C/
points)  points)
Ghana
1992-1998  67  64  49  -15  28  19  -9
Madagascar
1993-1999  81  74.5  76.7  2.2  50.1  52.1  2
Mauritania
1987-1995  56  68  48  -20  45  17  -28
Nigeria
1992-1996  62  46  72  +26  37  59  22
Uganda
1992-1997  88  59  48  -11  28  16  -12
Zambia
1993-1996  62  92  83  -9  45  46  +1
1996-1998  62  83  83  0  46  55  +9
Zimbabwe
1991-1996  63  36  48  +12  3  8  +5
Sources:  Studies under the Poverty Dynamics program.
From Figure  4,  we  see  that poverty in Accra  fell sharply,  but not in  other urban areas.  In the
Savannah  zone  poverty  increased in both urban  and rural  areas, and  especially in the Northern
Region  and  among  subsistence  farmers."  The  fact  that  growth  in  Ghana  saw  the  Gini  ratio
18  This finding was confirmed by the repeated cross-sectional  multivariate analysis (Coulombe and
McKay, 2001).28
improve and aggregate poverty fall is very little comfort to food farmers and urban workers in the
north of the country, who probably compare their fortunes with Accra residents.  Important clues
as  to  why  Ghanaians  in  the  north did  not benefit  from  growth  are  found  in recent  papers  by
Badiane and Shively (1998) and Abdulai (2000), which conclude that markets (more specifically
the maize market)  in the remoter Northern  Region are not very well integrated with the economy
at large.  This lack of integration most likely impeded the transmission of the benefits of growth
to the region.
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'Remoteness'  is also important in understanding geographical  differences in poverty outcomes in
Madagascar.  Paternostro,  Razafindravonona  and Stifel (2001)  disaggregate  poverty according to
an index of remoteness,  the latter being  a weighted sum of indicators reflecting  access  to roads,
bus  stop, agricultural  extension  services,  modem  fertilizers,  and  distance to schools  and health
facilities (the weights were  derived  from factor analysis).  Their  findings (Table  14)  indicate an
association between  the degree of remoteness  and the likelihood  of being in poverty.  They also
show  that  while  rural  poverty  indicators  were  largely  unchanged  during  1997  and  1999,
households  assessed  to  be the  most remote,  experienced  increased  poverty-in  contrast  to the
least remote quintile where poverty indicators actually improved.29
Table 14:  Madagascar, rural poverty by 'degree of remoteness'
Headcount  (Po)  Depth (P)
1997  1999  1997  1999
Rural  76.0  76.7  34.7  36.1
Quintile of 'remoteness index'
Most remote  78.0  82.8  34.8  42.4
2nd quintile  78.2  78.9  38.1  35.6
3rd quintile  74.5  78.9  32.7  37.7
4 th quintile  77.0  77.7  36.6  36.5
Least remote  72.6  65.9  31.6  29.0
Source:  Paternostro,  Razafindravonona  and Stifel  (2001).
Distribution, poverty and private endowments
The  experiences  in  Ethiopia  and  Uganda  demonstrated  that  better-endowed  households,
particularly  more  educated  households  and  those with  more  (fertile)  land,  were  not  only  less
likely  to  be  poor,  but  also  more  likely  to  benefit  from  favorable  changes  in  the  macro-
environment.  The  importance  of  education  for  poverty  reduction  is  echoed  by  the  micro-
econometric  evidence  from  Ghana,  Madagascar,  and  Zimbabwe. 1 9 Both  in  Ghana  and
Madagascar,  real  consumption  levels  increase  with  educational  attainment.  And the returns  to
education across the different education levels  increased from the first to the second survey year.
These  observations  hold  for  both  urban  and  rural  areas.  In  Zimbabwe,  a  more  precipitous
increase  in  poverty  following  the  economic  decline  was  prevented  because  of  previous
investments  in schooling that increased  the educational  attainment of the population in the  1990s
(Alwang and Mills,  2001).  That incomes  fell  and poverty increased  despite  household  efforts to
invest in human  capital,  assets and migration  (see Figure  6,  panel B) can  only be attributed  to a
reduction in the rates of returns, which Alwang  and Mills relate to an overall  deterioration of the
economic and institutional climate.
Evidence  from  Madagascar,  the  only  other  study  which  explicitly  addresses  the  role  of land
holdings,  confirms  that consumption  levels  are  higher  for  those  who  possess  land,  except  for
those with only  a very small  amount of land (less than  0.1  hectare  per capita).  Retums to  land
'9  One constraint  these  studies  face is the absence  of reliable price  data  (linked that is, to the household
data),  which  would  be  needed  to  assess  the  direct  impact  of the  reforms  on  consumption.  Systematic
changes  in real  producer  prices  are  certain to  have affected  income  distribution  and  poverty  during  this
period.  However, both the Madagascar and Zimbabwe  studies control for rainfall shocks,  an issue to which
we return below.*30
holdings  also increase  with the size of the plots owned.  Returns  to land  holdings deteriorated
from 1993  to  1999 for households with less than 0.4 hectares per capita, while they improved for
those with more land.  The changes in returns decreased poverty incidence among the latter group
by 2 percentage  points,  while it increased poverty  among the former by 0.82 percentage points.
Paternostro, Razafindravonona  and Stifel (2001)  hypothesize that this difference  follows  from an
extensification  of land  use by smallholders  in  the face  of demographic  pressures  forcing  small
farmers to expand their fields into less productive and more fragile areas.
Distribution, poverty and shocks
Poverty estimates provide a snapshot of the standard of living at a certain point in time and reflect
both policy reforms as well as temporary external  shocks such as droughts.  When evaluating the
evolution  of  poverty  it  is  thus  important  to  control  for  the  effect  of  external  shocks  on
comparative  poverty  figures.  Controlling  for  all  other  factors,  the  Ethiopian  panel  analysis
estimated that household income growth was reduced by about a fifth because of rainfall  shortage
(Dercon, 2001).  The role of rainfall variations in influencing household income growth was also
an important feature of the Zimbabwean and Madagascar experience.
That poverty increased  sharply in Zimbabwe  during the  1990s is without question (Alwang  and
Mills, 2001).  The decline  in economic  well-being (and increase  in poverty)  is evident  from the
leftward shift in the distribution of real household consumption  (Figure 5).  The change occurred
mainly in the vicinity of the poverty line (Z$30  per month)-a sharp increase  in the numbers  of
people consuming just below,  and a parallel  decline  in the numbers just above  the poverty  line.
What is less clear is whether poverty increased  because of the droughts that afflicted the country
in  1991/92  and  again  in  1994/95,  or because  of the Economic  Structural  Adjustment  Program
(launched in 1991)  which was being implemented at the same time.
Alwang and  Mills (2001)  apply non-parametric  methods to  simulate what the  1995  distribution
would have been if the  1990 rainfall patterns  had applied that year.  This exercise  confrmns that
the  drought  led  to  an increase  in poverty  during the  early  1990s, but  it also  indicates  that the
drought  alone cannot  fully explain  the deterioration  in economic  well-being (Figure  6 Panel A).
As  discussed before,  actual changes  in household  location,  assets  and  individual  characteristics
(notably the levels of educational  attainment) would actually,  other things  constant, have  raised
consumption levels and reduced poverty (Figure 6 Panel B).31
Figure 5: Zimbabwe,  shift in welfare distribution, 1990-1995
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Figure 6:  Zimbabwe,  simulated effects of rainfall and household characteristics  on changes
in the welfare distribution,  1990 - 1995.
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Source:  Alwang and Mills (2001)32
Evidence from Madagascar  further  underscores  the importance  of weather  shocks  in comparing
poverty over time.  Simulations  indicated that 75  percent  of the predicted  change  in household
economic well-being and poverty incidence  could be traced back to the relative change  in drought
occurrence  between  1993  and  1999.  The  insurance  capacity  of households  against  covariate
shocks in many parts of Africa is clearly extremely limited.
IV.  Concluding remarks
The evidence of the 1  990s gives ground for cautious optimism.  In the aggregate  at least, episodes
of growth have been pro-poor in Africa, and countries which have  experienced a recovery  in their
macro-economic  balances  and the quality  of their  institutions have seen  the numbers  in poverty
decline.  But there  are  three  serious qualifications.  First,  experiences  have varied enormously.
Some  countries  have  enjoyed  a  decade  of sustained  growth,  and  others have had to  cope  with
crisis  and  decline.  In  the  eight  countries  covered  by  the  Poverty Dynamics  study,  four
experienced significant declines in poverty (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mauritania  and Uganda),  two faced
sharp increases  (Nigeria  and Zimbabwe),  and in  two  (Madagascar  and Zambia)  there  was no
discernable  trend, the outcome  depending on the specific  circumstances  (rainfall, terms of trade)
of the years in question.
The  second qualification  derives  from the need  to go beyond the averages.  While it is true that
overall income  distributions  (evidenced  by  the  Gini  ratio)  have  not  changed  during  African
episodes of growth,  and that such growth (or recession)  can be characterized  as pro-poor in this
aggregate  sense,  this  can  be  misleading.  Beneath  the  aggregate  numbers  exists  a  variety  of
experiences.  Neglect of this reality by policymakers-and  sometimes  also academics-has  often
impeded  a  constructive  and  fruitful  dialogue  with  'civil  society'  about  appropriate  poverty
reducing  policies (Kanbur,  2001).  Third,  the Poverty Dynamics work highlights the importance
of taking different perspectives of poverty.  Although trends in human development indicators are
generally consistent with economic well-being, their  dynamics have been quite different in some
countries.  The  multifaceted  nature  of poverty  (emphasized  in  the 2000/1  World  Development
Report) calls for multivariate  approaches to tracking and understanding its dynamics.
Focusing on income  poverty,  our review of the evidence  shows  that there have been  systematic
changes  in income  distributions  and poverty in the countries  covered.  We  have identified  some
of the main contours of these distribution changes, and highlighted four key policy messages:  the33
importance of economic reform and political stability for poverty reduction; the role of geography
and remoteness  in  conditioning  how  the benefits  of growth  are  distributed;  the  significance  of
private  endowments  (especially  education  and  land)  for  the  ability  of  households  to  take
advantage  of new  opportunities,  and the  consequent poverty  outcomes;  and  finally the need  to
account for shocks in understanding distributional outcomes and poverty changes over time.
The  'emerging picture'  described by Demery and Squire (1996)  appears to be confirmed with the
better  data (reflecting also  a longer time  perspective than previous work).  Improvements  in the
macroeconomic  balances are associated  with reductions in poverty in the region.  There is also an
emerging micro-picture  concerning  the consumption poverty impact of market liberalization.  The
analysis of household panel data by Dercon (2001)  for Ethiopia  and Deininger and Okidi  (2001)
for  Uganda  provide  the  most systematic  and  empirically  convincing  cases  that policy-induced
changes  in  relative  prices  can  have  marked  poverty-reducing  effects.  Micro-evidence  from
Ghana provides some  corroboration  from West Africa.
The  second policy  message  is  the need  for  a  geographical  perspective  on poverty.  Whilst the
various  rounds  of poverty  assessments  have  established  that  the  incidence  of poverty  varies
considerably  across  different  regions  of a  country,  this  recent  work  on  poverty  dynamics  has
shown that some  regions, by virtue of their sheer remoteness,  have been left behind  somewhat as
growth has picked up.  Households  with limited access  to markets  and public services  have not
benefited  from  growth  during  the  1990s.  Public  policy,  and  the  provision  of public  goods
(notably infrastructure  services-from the Ethiopian case, especially roads and from the Ugandan
case, electricity) must address these fundamental regional inequalities.
Third, both education and access to land emerge  as key private  endowments to enable households
to escape  poverty.  The  importance  of education  for poverty reduction  is brought  out in  all our
case  studies-in  rural  and  urban  areas-with  the  marginal  returns  to  education  typically
increasing  by educational  attainment.  While  land redistributions  may not be  appropriate  in  all
countries,  as  argued by  Dercon  (2001)  for  Ethiopia,  it is ultimately  the productive  capacity of
land which matters.  A more efficient organization of agricultural  services and agricultural inputs,
such as  fertilizer,  could  go a  long way towards  improving productivity of land (Kherallah  et al.,
1  999).
Finally, the empirical  evidence reviewed here underscores the importance of social protection in a
poverty reduction  strategy.  The impact of rainfall variations and ill health are the two risk factors34
featured.  Dercon  (2001)  estimates  that  poverty  reduction  in  the  sample  of Ethiopian  rural
communities  would have been  18  percentage points greater had households  been protected from
the  effects of ill-health  and rainfall  shortages.  The  importance  of weather  shocks  for poverty
changes was also underscored by the findings from Zimbabwe and Madagascar.  Deininger and
Okidi  (2001)  find  that  ill-health  amongst  Ugandans  back  in  1992  noticeably  increased  the
probability of being in poverty eight years later.  And in light of households'  greater exposure to
the vagaries  of world commodity prices following liberalization,  policies to help the poor manage
their risks have become  even more important nowadays.35
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